What is NSC 68?
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, better known as NSC 68, was a 66-page top secret National Security Council (NSC) policy paper drafted by the Department of State and Department of Defense and presented to President Harry S. Truman on 7 April 1950.
Was nsc68 fear-mongering?
NSC68 was fear-mongering at its highest peak, and some students of foreign policy learned this all too well for America and the world. In NSC68 Nitze advised that superiority was the key to security, that the US pursue unbridled military research and development to stay ahead of any potential aggressor.
What was the National Security Council paper 68 summary?
National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68) Presented to President Harry Truman on April 14, 1950, the document concluded that, following the end of WWII, revived Russian expansionism required the United States to embark upon a massive political, economic, and military build-up to contain the Soviet threat and expansion of Communism.
What was Paul Nitze’s opinion on NSC-68?
In the works of Paul Nitze, the chief author of NSC-68: [In 1949], I was very much worried and so were some of my fellow workers by the fact that in the preceding year a number of adverse things had happened.
What was the main idea of NSC-68?
Building upon the conclusions of an earlier National Security Council paper (NSC-20/4), the authors of NSC-68 based their conclusions on the theory that the decline of the Western European powers and Japan following World War II had left the United States and the Soviet Union as the two dominant powers.
How long did the NSC-68 policy prescriptions last?
The policy prescriptions of NSC-68 did not last very long (although this might be open to debate): This policy, however, was never really put into effect. To be sure, very important rearmament decisions were made in late 1950, but in practice the U.S. government never tried to do more than defend the status quo.